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Non-pecuniary Work Incentive and Labor Supply 
Summary 
Recognizing that people value employment not only to earn income to satisfy their 
consumption needs, but also as a means to gain socio-psychological (nonpecuniary) 
benefits, we show that once nonpecuniary work incentives are incorporated into 
standard labor supply theory, (i) the wage rate under-estimates (over-estimates) the true 
value of nonwork/leisure time when work has nonpecuniary benefits (costs), (ii) 
nonpecuniary benefits can be a substitute for monetary wages as work incentives, (iii) at 
very low wage rates, work can become a net source of utility, and (iii) the shape of labor 
supply curve differs from standard theory. We also identify conditions under which a 
greater nonpecuniary work incentive generates a larger individual labor supply, and 
examine the effects of non-wage income on labor supply both for paid and voluntary 
work. 
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1 Introduction 
If being employed is not only a source of earning income to satisfy materialistic 
needs, but also the principal means of community involvement, then employment can 
provide socio-psychological (or nonpecuniary) benefits. However, the standard theory of 
individual labor supply focuses on an individualistic notion of work and abstracts from the 
nonpecuniary benefits. It considers work as a source of disutility, and any time off work 
(leisure) as a source of utility, assuming that utility always decreases with hours worked.
1 
Standard labor-leisure choice theory asks how an individual makes a tradeoff between 
consumption (made possible by work) and leisure (time not allocated to work), but ignores 
the socio-psychological effects of employment.  This shortcoming of the standard theory, 
which treats labor time merely as a means of earning income, is lucidly expressed by 
Krugman (1998, P.15): “Economics textbooks may treat the exchange of labor for money as 
a transaction much like the sale of a bushel of apples, but we all know that in human terms 
there is a huge difference. A merchant may sell many things, but a worker usually has only 
one job, which supplies not only his livelihood but often much of his sense of identity. An 
unsold commodity is a nuisance, an unemployed worker a tragedy”.  This raises a basic 
question: How is the individual labor supply decision affected by the nonpecuniary effects of 
work? 
In this paper, we go beyond the standard neoclassical income-leisure choice, where 
the value of leisure is the cost of income foregone, and follow sociologists and psychologists 
(see, for example, Jahoda (1981)(1982), Whelan (1994) and Agerbo et al (1998)), who 
recognize that, in addition to being a source of income and material satisfaction, employment 
can provide non-materialistic individual satisfactions. By incorporating the positive 
nonpecuniary effects of employment on individual well-being, we extend the standard labor 
supply model and provide several new insights.
2   
                                                 
1 See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, Ch. 4 and 11), Varian (1984, Ch. 6), and 
Killingsworth (1986), for a standard treatment of labor supply.   
 
2 A notable departure from the standard model is Becker’s (1965) insightful model of choice where an 
individual (or household) combines nonwork time with market goods to produce commodities or 
  1The next section briefly reviews some of the empirical studies indicating the presence 
of nonpecuniary benefits from work. In Section 3.0 we extend the standard labor supply 
model, showing in Section 3.1 that, when work involves nonpecuniary benefits (costs), the 
standard theory’s valuation of nonwork/leisure time at the wage rate results in an under-
estimation (over-estimation) of its true value, thus leading to an over-allocation (under-
allocation) of time to nonwork activities. This simple but quite striking result has important 
implications for correct cost-benefit assessment of nonwork activities (such as recreational, 
transportation, household and do-it-yourself activities) and unemployment, retirement, and 
disability compensation schemes. The extended model shows explicitly that nonpecuniary 
benefits and monetary wages are substitute incentives in employment and labor supply 
decisions. As such, it can help to explain, among other things, why people sometimes choose 
lower-paying jobs and resist retirement despite financially attractive compensation and 
benefits schemes, or even offer their labor voluntarily. Section 3.2 shows that in the presence 
of nonpecuniary work incentives, as the wage rate, and hence income and consumption, 
declines below a critical level, the time not allocated to work (leisure) may lose its 
desirability to such an extent that one chooses to work as much as possible. Indeed, it shows 
that at very low wage rates, work can even become a source of utility.  As such, our model 
implies an individual labor supply curve that differs markedly from that derived from the 
standard theory. Section 4 extends the analysis of Section 3 by examining the effects of non-
wage income on labor supply both when the individual earns wage income and when she 
works voluntarily.  It shows that depending on the individual’s preferences and the share of 
non-wage income in total income, an increase in non-wage income can enlarge or shrink the 
range of wages at which labor is supplied fully and perfectly inelastically.  It also shows that 
                                                                                                                                                       
services whose consumption yields utility.  In that model, leisure is not the same as nonwork time; it 
is a consumption good or service whose production is time intensive and its full cost consists of both 
the direct cost of market goods and the foregone earnings due to spending time to produce leisure 
activities. Becker examines the effects of changes in the foregone income on hours of work, 
productivity measurement and economics of queues. As such, Becker’s model and the focus of 
analysis differ from those of the present paper which concentrates on the socio-psychological 
(nonpecuniary) effect of work on utility and hence labor supply. In fact, in Becker’s model the 
amount of time allocated to work “.. would be determined solely by the effect on income and not by 
any effect on utility” (p.498), where income denotes “the money income achieved if all the time 
available were devoted to work” (p.497).  
 
 
  2below a critical income level voluntary work will be offered fully, but for higher incomes, 
voluntary work decreases with income. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Nonpecuniary Value of Employment  
Employment is a principal means for people to connect and become involved with 
communal activities. In turn, whether through self-assessment or assessment by others, 
community involvement directly or indirectly brings a sense of self-esteem, self-respect, 
belonging, identity, recognition, reputation, friendship, security, and status, all of which are 
ingredients of one’s quality of life and satisfaction (Jahoda (1988)).
3  In fact, the phrase “I 
am what I do” is sometimes used to express the socio-psychological importance of work. 
Being employed is an essential determinant of happiness; the unemployed have significantly 
lower well-being scores in the social psychology and labor economics literature (see, for 
example, Fryer and Payne (1986), Feather (1990) and Argyle (2001)). Further, Lucas, et al 
(2004), find strong statistical evidence that the adverse effect of unemployment on 
individuals’ subjective well-being persists even after they become re-employed. More 
interestingly, empirical work in labor economics has established that unemployment is 
strongly negatively correlated with individual well-being, even after controlling for income 
and other individual characteristics. In other words, the unemployed are generally worse off 
than the employed, and by more than their lower income would predict (see, for example, 
Clark and Oswald (1994), Korpi (1997), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Di Tella, 
MacCulloch and Oswald (2001)(2003), and Clark (2003) and references cited therein).  For 
example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) used panel data on life satisfaction from 
German-Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-1989, where the individual’s subjective well-being 
was measured on an ordinal scale from 0 to 10.  After controlling for income and various 
observed individual characteristics and specific fixed effects, they found that (a) being 
unemployed has a statistically significant and substantial negative effect on satisfaction, and 
(b) the pecuniary costs of unemployment, occurring directly through reduced income, are 
                                                 
3 For a general treatment of the effects of identity on economic behavior and outcomes, see Akerlof 
(2000). See particularly Akerlof and Kranton (2003)(2005) for a novel and insightful principal-agent 
model analyzing the effects of workers’ identification with a firm, or with a job, or with a work group, 
on their incentives to exert effort, on wage rate variation, and on firms’ optimal management 
strategies. For a survey of the social psychological consequences of unemployment and implications 
for behavioral macroeconomic model and policy see Darity and Goldsmith (1996).  
  3much smaller than the nonpecuniary costs, occurring indirectly through reduced well-being. 
They estimated that income would have to be increased by a factor of seven in order to 
generate an increase in satisfaction large enough to offset the adverse effect of 
unemployment.  Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) came to similar conclusions. 
Using the Euro-Barometer data on individual life satisfaction, ordered on a four-point scale 
for 12 European countries for the period 1975-91, they found that, controlling for the income 
loss and other indirect effects, being unemployed has a strong negative effect on well-being. 
Based on Di Tella et al’s estimated happiness function, Frey and Stutzer (2002) calculated 
the compensation variation for being unemployed rather than holding a job and noted that “a 
move from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile would not be enough to 
offset the adverse effect of unemployment, suggesting that unemployed people suffer high 
nonpecuniary costs (p.402)”. These results suggest that being unemployed significantly 
reduces people’s well-being, even when receiving the same income as when employed.  As 
Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003, pp. 819-820) note “Being unemployed is much 
worse than is implied by the drop in income alone. The economist’s standard method of 
judging the disutility from being laid off focuses on pecuniary losses. According to our 
calculations, that is a mistake, because it understates the full well-being costs, which 
according to the data, appear to be predominantly nonpecuniary.”  The facts that in advanced 
industrial countries, where social safety nets cushion joblessness, some individuals prefer to 
be employed with earnings less than the unemployment benefit or to engage in voluntary 
work are evidence of nonpecuniary value of employment.
4  Furthermore, the presence of 
nonpecuniary value of employment is strongly suggested by Mulligan’s (1998) insightful 
empirical study of the dramatic increase in civilian work in the United States during World 
War II.  Ruling out the changes in workers’ budget sets (the after-tax real wages were 
substantially lower than either before or after the war) or other pecuniary explanations such 
as wealth effects of government policies, wage-induced interpemporal substitution, and 
changes in the nonmarket price of time, she concluded that nonpecuniary motives such as 
patriotism and changing discrimination against women can explain the phenomenon.  
                                                 
4  Moffitt (1983) finds strong empirical support for the existence of welfare stigma among eligible but 
non-participants in AFDC-U, the welfare program for which families with an unemployed male were 
eligible.    
  4Finally, using data from the Alaska salmon fisheries, which have been subject to 
entry limitations since 1975, Karpoff (1985) tested the hypothesis that fishermen receive 
significant nonpecuniary benefits from work by estimating the present value of the expected 
rent stream from fishing and examining whether permit prices reflected a premium above 
what monetary income alone would suggest. He found that the continued presence of many 
low-income fishermen in the fisheries was evidence that they derive nonpecuniary benefits 
from fishing.  
 
3.0 An Extended Model of Labor Supply  
The findings of the empirical studies cited in the previous section and those of many 
others for different countries and time periods suggest the presence of nonpecuniary benefits 
from work, thus contradicting the standard theory’s basic assumption that work is merely a 
burden and source of disutility to individuals. In this section, we incorporate the 
nonpecuniary benefits of work in the standard model and derive implications for valuation of 
nonwork time and individual labor supply.  
Let   be the individual utility function, where   is consumption, 
 is leisure time, and   captures all the nonpecuniary effects (NPE) of employment. 
We assume that one’s involvement with the community, and hence the NPE, increases with 
the labor time   (i.e. ).
(,, ) UU c z m = 0 c ≥
0 z ≥ 0 m≥
0 l ≥ () 0 ml ′ >
5 We make the standard assumptions that the utility 
function is increasing in each of its arguments (i.e.,  ) 
at decreasing rates (i.e.,  ) and that both leisure and NPE are 
complements with consumption (i.e.,  ).
0, 0, 0, as 0 czmc UUUU c >>>→ ∞ →
0, 0, 0 cc zz mm UUU << <
0, 0 cz cm UU >>
                                                
6 Additionally, although not essential 
 
5 For analytical simplicity, and as an approximation to reality, we are assuming that the nonpecuniary 
effect of work is a continuous and increasing function of the amount of work,l . In reality, it may 
generally be an increasing step function. Furthermore, beyond the assumption that , it is 
difficult to be sure about the curvature of this function, although it seems plausible to assume that 
beyond certain level, the marginal value of NPE declines as labor time increases, i.e., that 
becomes an increasing concave function. Also, we abstract from the interdependence of   
preferences among individuals and the effect it may have on an individual’s nonpecuniary value of 
employment. For example, the nonpecuniary cost of unemployment can well depend on the rate of 
unemployment among peer groups and the degree of adherence to the social norm of employment (see 
Clark (2003) for an empirical study of this). 
() 0 ml ′ >
() ml
 
6 Wherever no confusion arises, subscripts denote partial derivatives.  
  5to our analysis, we assume that  , implying that leisure and NPE are complements in 
the individual’s preferences: the greater the nonpecuniary effects of one’s employment the 
better one would appreciate additional leisure time. Of course, one can think of some extreme 
preferences, such as those of either ‘isolationist” or “community devout” persons, for which 
leisure and NPE can be substitutes.  
0 zm U ≥
 Let   be the individual’s total available time per decision period, which may be 
a day, week, month, etc.  This fixed total time can be allocated between work and leisure, so 
that
0 T ≥
z Tl =− . We can then rewriteU in the reduced form of   
         ( 1 )  
  The overall, or net, marginal utility of labor time is 
u(c,l)= U(c,T - l,m(l))
  // zm u l dU dl U U m l ( ) ′ ∂∂ = = −+       ( 2 )  
where the first term on the right-hand side is the marginal disutility of labor and the second 
term is the marginal utility of labor that arises from the non- pecuniary value of employment. 
It seems plausible to think that, at any given consumption level , for sufficiently large 
values of    the first term dominates the second one (implying that at the margin labor 
becomes a net source of disutility, 
c
l
( , ) / 0 uc l u l ≡ ∂∂ < A ) and vice versa for sufficiently small 
values of  .  So, we assume:  l
(A1): For  each  c> , there exists a unique such that   0 l(c) > 0 ˆ
   for      and        (3)  zm u(c,l)/ l = -U +U m (l)= 0 ′ ∂∂ l=l ( c ) ˆ
l
><
u (c,l) 0     l  l(c) <> ⇔ ˆ
That is,  is the threshold labor time, at consumption level , so that the marginal disutility 
of labor exactly offsets its marginal utility.  In Figure 1, l(c) is shown by the dashed curved. 
Furthermore, we assume that: 
l(c) ˆ c
ˆ
(A2):  u(  is strictly quasi-concave.   c,l)
(A3): As consumption level rises, leisure becomes more valuable than the NPE of 
work.  Formally, we assume  




ˆ      (4) 
  6Noting from (3) that at along the l(c  locus, one has ) ˆ ( ) / z ml U U m ′ = , condition (4) can also be 
written as   
  ( ) ˆ [,() ] [ ] 0    a l l   ,() 0 cm cz z
c
mz
cU cU U uc l c c l c
cU U
=− < A ˆ >
                                                
   (4’) 
That is, we assume the elasticity of marginal value of leisure with respect to consumption 
(the second-term in the bracket) exceeds that of the nonpecuniary effects (the first term in the 
bracket). 
Assumption (A3), as presented formally by (4), together with assumption (A2), imply 
that l(c) ˆ  is decreasing in   c
7; that is, the richer is a household the lower is the threshold labor 
time where labor becomes a net source of disutility. This seems quite plausible; the higher 
the living standard of a household the more distasteful become the additional working hours 
(the larger the marginal disutility of work) and therefore the smaller will be the critical 
working time  .    ˆ l
Figure 1 below depicts the indifference curves associated with the utility function 
under assumptions (A1)-(A3). u(c,l)
8 Above the curve of  , the indifference curves slope 
upward everywhere since  , indicating that, on net, work is a source of disutility at 
the margin. The opposite is true everywhere below the curve of l(c) ˆ .
l(c) ˆ
l u( c , l )<0
9  
 
ˆ 7 To derive this formally, totally differentiate u to have . On 
the other hand, by (A2), u is strictly quasi-concave and thus, , 
which upon substituting   yields  . That is,  . Thus, 
 
[c,l(c)] = 0 l
ˆ dl(c)/dc = -u [c,l(c)]/u [c,l(c)] lc ll
ˆˆ
22 2u u u - [u (u ) + u (u ) ] > 0 cc c c lc l l l l
u [c,l(c)] = 0 l
ˆ 2 u( u) < 0 ll c u[ c , l ( c ) ] < 0 ll
ˆ
dl(c)/dc = -u [c,l(c)]/u [c,l(c)] < 0 u [c,l(c)] < 0. lc ll lc ⇔ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ
8  An example of a utility function satisfying assumptions (A1)-(A3) is  , where 
the time endowment is normalized so that 
η ηcl u(c,l)= c l + c(1- l) γ
1 T =  and .  The indifference 
map illustrated in Figure 1 corresponds to this utility function.  
l [0,1],   0 < η < η <1 ,  >0 c l
γ ∈
 
9 As depicted in Figure 1, it seems plausible to assume that no matter how high one’s consumption 




) and that at the 
subsistence level of living ( c ) the marginal value of leisure tends to zero, implying that one would 
supply as much labor as feasible (i.e.,  ˆ lim l(c) = T
cc →
, where 0c < ≤ ∞ ).   
  7         ˆ l(c) 
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   Figure 1: labor supply with nonpecuniary incentives 
Now, consider an individual’s decision problem. Let   be the given wage rate in 
terms of the consumption good whose price is normalized to be
0 w>
1 p = . Then the problem is 
   
c, l Max   u(c,l)
s.t. wl - c 0, c 0,
and     T - l 0, l 0
≥≥
≥≥
        ( 5 )  
The Lagrangian is L=u(c,l)+μ(wl -c)+ν(T -l), where μ  and   are the Lagrange 
multipliers. Given our assumption that  , implying , and hence , 
the necessary conditions for optimal are 
ν
c ua s c →∞ →0
* c> 0
* l> 0
** (c ,l )







u( c, l )-μ =0 ;
u( c, l )+μw-ν =0 ;
wl - c = 0,  μ >0 ;
ν(T - l )= 0,  ν 0. ≥
      ( 6 )  
For the optimal , we have the following three cases: 
** (c ,l )
 Case  (1):  ν=0 so that 
* lT ≤ , and   
**
l u( c, l )<0 ,
 Case  (2):  ν>0 so that  , and 
* l= T
**
l u( c, l ) 0 , ≤     ( 7 )    
 Case  (3):  ν>0 so that  , and  .  
* l= T
**
l u( c, l )>0
  8The three cases distinguished in (7) are presented graphically in Figure 1. As we 
show in the following sections, these cases enable us to obtain several new insights about 
labor supply decisions.  
 
3.1 Value of Leisure/Nonwork Time 
We note that in Case (1), at the optimum, the net marginal utility of labor is negative, 
 thus resembling the assumption of the standard model of labor-leisure choice 
where labor is regarded only as a source of disutility. This case characterizes an interior 
solution which satisfies the condition 
**









− = (shown by point A in Figure 1), and 
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−= , where 
1
B w
 is the slope of the budget line OB in Figure 1. Although at 
first sight this condition appears to be the familiar optimality condition of the standard 
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1
w
), there is, however, a subtle 
difference because in our model  ( , ) lz m uc l - U+ Um ( l ) ′ =  represents the net effect of an 
additional unit of work on utility. To see this difference more clearly, let us substitute for 
 and recall that  (,) lz m uc l - U+ Um ( l ) ′ = c uU c ≡  to rewrite the optimality condition in the 








ucl Um ( l ) U dc dc
MRS w
dz dl u c l U U
′
≡− = =− = − =    (8) 
In contrast to our model, the standard theory, by ignoring the marginal nonpecuniary 
value of work, incorrectly equates the marginal opportunity cost of  leisure with the wage 






= ) whereas in fact the opportunity cost of an additional unit of leisure 
consists of the foregone wage rate and the marginal nonpecuniary value of  work. As such, it 
  9is equal to the wage rate plus the marginal nonpecuniary value of work, expressed in terms of 
units of consumption good (i.e., 
m
c
Um ( l )
U
′
).  Thus, from (8) we have   
   [1 ]
mm z
cc c






      (8’) 
which leads us to the following proposition.  
Proposition 1: By ignoring the NPE of work and equating the value of leisure time with the 
wage rate, the standard labor theory under-estimates  (over-estimates) the true value of 
leisure time when there are nonpecuniary benefits (costs) associated with work.  
 
This result has important implications for valuation of time allocated to nonwork 
activities (such as recreational, do-it-yourself, and household activities) or in cost-benefit 
assessment of unemployment, retirement, and disability compensation schemes, and the like. 
It shows that valuing nonwork time at the individual’s wage rate (as prescribed by the 
standard theory) suffers from a downward (upward) bias when the time spent on work 
involves nonpecuniary benefits (costs), leading to more (less) time to be allocated to such 
activities, or to less (more) unemployment/disability/retirement compensation payment, than 
would be optimal. 
10  
Interestingly, consistent with Proposition 1, in a survey of the empirical studies of 
travel-time valuation in the literature on demand for recreation services and on transportation 
planning, Cesario (1976) noted that the available estimates of the value of travel time had 
been consistently substantially less than the wage rate- ranging between one-forth and one-
half of the wage rate- leading him to conclude that “It is clear from these findings that the use 
of the marginal wage rate for the value of travel-time values in recreation benefit estimation 
is inappropriate, both from the theoretical and practical points of view.”(P.37). Cesario’s  
theoretical justification for the travel-time value being less than the wage rate hinged on his 
assumption that there is always “disutility” (or, more precisely, nonpecuniary costs) 
associated with work. Although this assumption is unnecessarily too narrow, in terms of the 
result furnished in (8’) it implies  0
m
c
Um ( l )
Uw
′
<  and hence a value of leisure time less than the 
                                                 
10 Viscusi (1993, p.1943) notes that prior to 1980s, the U.S. Federal  agencies such as Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) and  EPA  would use the estimates of value of life based on assessing 
only the lost present value of the earnings of the deceased and ignoring the nonpecuniary aspects of life, 
thus leading to dramatic underestimation of the benefit value. 
  10wage rate.
11 Based on the empirical results surveyed, Cesario (1976) assumed the 
opportunity cost of travel time to be equal to one-third of the wage rate, and used this 
assumption to generate benefit estimates for a set of parks in the northeastern United States. 
On the other hand, testing this assumption versus the hypothesis of the wage rate as the 
opportunity cost of time, Smith, et al (1983) found that neither hypothesis was 
unambiguously superior to the other as approximations for the opportunity cost of nonwork 
(leisure) time. In fact, estimating the multiple factor relating the opportunity cost of nonwork 
time to the wage rate, Smith et al found that twelve of the twenty-two estimated values for 
this multiple were negative and a majority of the remaining estimates were greater than 
unity, leading them to the conclusion that both hypotheses should be rejected and that “the 
estimation of the multiple relating these opportunity costs to the wage rate is not a trivial 
task. Moving beyond a judgmental guess for this multiple will be difficult within the 
constraints of existing data” (p.276).    
Against this background, our result presented in (8’) and Proposition 1 can be viewed 
as providing a general theoretical basis which reconciles these ambiguous, and seemingly 
conflicting empirical findings as special cases resting on some set of restrictive assumptions. 
This is seen clearly once we note that depending on whether we assume (1) individuals’ 
preferences to be identical or heterogeneous, (2) nonpecuniary effects associated with work 
are positive or negative, or (3) nonpecuniary effects associated with travel itself are positive 
or negative, and on allowing for the multiple factor [1 ]
m
c
Um ( l )
Uw
′
+ to be a nonlinear function 
of the wage rate, our result in (8’) can be consistent with empirical estimations of travel-time 
values that are less than, greater than, or, for that matter, equal to, the wage rate, and 
estimated values that can be increasing, constant, or decreasing in the wage rate. For 
instance, when travel time competes with other nonwork (leisure) activities in allocation of 
the leisure time, , and if we assume that a typical individual derives nonpecuniary benefits  z
                                                 
11 Becker (1965) also notes that the value of nonwork time may deviate from the wage rate but for 
different reasons than that in the present model; namely, the constraint of the period in which time is spent 
(i.e., the “timing” of the time spent) and the indirect positive effect of consumption of leisure goods or 
services on a person’s productivity.   For example, he holds that the value of nonwork time “is often less 
[than the wage rate] on week-ends and in the evenings because many firms are closed then” (p.503),  and 
is also less when it is spent on such activities as sleeping, eating, reading, taking a hair cut, commuting, 
recreation, or in general on “productive consumption”.  
  11both from work and from travel itself, then our extended theory predicts the value of travel 
time to exceed that of leisure, which in turn will be greater than the individual’s wage rate. In 
the opposite case, where the typical individual has preferences such that there are 
nonpecuniary costs associated with both work and travel, then our theoretical result suggests 
that the travel time value will be less than the opportunity cost of leisure which itself will be 
less than the wage rate.  
At the macroeconomic level, the result provides a theoretical basis for the empirical 
findings noted in Section 2; namely, the welfare loss from unemployment is much more than 
what the loss of wages alone predicts. In a similar vein, it can explain why some people resist 
retirement or being laid off despite being offered financially attractive retirement or 
unemployment benefit packages.  






represents an individual’s supply (reservation) price of labor, the result, 
m z
cc





shows that in meeting one’s reservation price of labor, the monetary reward (wage) and 
nonpecuniary incentives are substitutes.  An important policy implication of this result is that 
a firm or employer may be able to pay lower compensations by taking actions to create and 
enhance employees’ nonpecuniary work motivation, or by employing workers who 
intrinsically identify themselves with the firm’s goal or ideal.  Inversely, when employees of 
a firm or an occupation do not derive nonpecuniary benefits from their jobs, or may even 
incur nonpecuniary costs, a firm may need to pay a premium wage (rent) to keep them 
motivated. Real-world observations supporting this result abound. For example, recognizing 
the tradeoff between salary and prestige, highly prestigious institutions may pay a relatively 
lower compensation to attract their employees (it has been said that for years Harvard 
University was notorious for asking new faculty recruited to take a pay cut to join it). 
Employment with military offers another example. As Akerlof and Kranton (2005) 
emphasize military officers are trained to identify themselves with the goals of military and 
believe in “service before self”, so that they are willing to trade off monetary rewards for 
nonpecuniary gains of being a military officer. This trade off between nonpecuniary and 
monetary incentives in military contrasts with that usually observed among civilian 
  12employees, and, as Akerlof and Kranton note, may explain why in the United States for a 
comparable position and rank military pay was significantly less than civilian pay until recent 
times. Other notable examples where employees strongly trade off monetary rewards for 
nonpecuniary work incentives are nurses, policemen, firefighters, artists, public-service 
minded bureaucrats and politicians, and not-for–profits organizations working for public or 
humanitarian causes. In fact, voluntary work is an extreme case where people supply labor 
without any monetary incentives. Conversely, most people shy away from occupations 
deemed personally or socially stigmatic, and those who choose such jobs demand 
comparatively much higher monetary rewards (wage rates) in compensation for a lack of, or 
negative, nonpecuniary incentive. Examples of these kinds of jobs are those linked to 
criminal or socially and personally undignified activities such as drug trafficking, money 
laundering, prostitution, and other underground activities.
12  
It is interesting to note in passing that our result goes somewhat against the wage 
efficiency result in the standard literature (see Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). According to the 
latter, to induce efficient supply of effort, a firm makes unemployment, the consequence of 
shirking, more costly by offering a worker a rent beyond the market wage rate (or worker’s 
reservation wage).  On the contrary, our result implies that a sufficiently large nonpecuniary 
value of employment, rather than high wages, can provide the incentive for a worker not to 
lose his job, and, in fact, given the substitutability of this incentive for monetary incentive, 
when a worker’s nonpecuniary incentive is substantial, a firm may even pay a lower wage 
rate than otherwise the market would offer. The implication of this contrast between our 
result and the wage efficiency is consistent with the interesting result furnished by Heyes 
(2005); namely, for jobs that confer significant nonpecuniary benefits (that is, vocation-
intensive jobs such as nursing and teaching), the efficiency wage theory can in fact lead to a 
reduction in the average quality of applicants attracted: higher wages may attract ‘wrong 
sort” of individuals-those who are driven principally by higher wages but have no intrinsic 
motivation or a vocation.  
                                                 
12  It should be noted that in emphasizing the nonpecuniary work incentives we are focusing on socio-
psychological factors affecting an individual’s utility and not on work conditions, such as ease or difficulty 
of a job, its stimulating or boring nature, the prospects of progress in the job, etc., which are more or less 
reflected in the wage rate. Thus, as Akerlof and Kranton (2003, P. 23) note “ Fast food workers in Harlem 
and Washington Heights-despite the grease, heat, disrespect from customers (especially teenagers), and 
low wages- still take pride that they earn their money”. 
  133.2.  Labor Supply in the Extended Model  
  Returning to Case (2) in (7), we note that, as in Case (1), the net effect of labor on 












 (point C), and includes the border case (point D) where at the 
optimum   By the definition of ˆ , point D must be at the 
intersection of the curve of ˆ  and the budget line and therefore satisfies  . We 
denote by   the critical wage rate that satisfies this condition. In Figure 1, the  
inverse of this wage rate (
**
ll u( c, l )=u( w T , T )=0 . () lc
() lc ˆ( Tl w T =




) is the slope of the budget line OD. Thus, for all the wage rates 
lying in between those corresponding to the slopes of budget lines OB and OD, that is, for 
, the optimum labor supply is   and  ˆ B www ≤≤
* l= T l u( w T , T ) 0 ≤ .  
Of special interest is Case (3) since, in contrast to Case (1) and Case (2), here labor is 
a net source of utility,  . Point E represents a typical solution corresponding to 
this case. Recalling that at the border point D, , Case (3) holds if .   
  We thus can state: 
**
l u( c, l )>0
1 ˆ ˆ () / wlTT
− ≡ ˆ ww <
Proposition 2: Once the standard theory is extended to include the nonpecuniary effects of 
employment in the individual’s utility function, then for sufficiently low wage rates 
( ) employment becomes a net source of 
1 ˆ ˆ () / wwlTT
− <= utility, inducing the individual to 
supply labor to the extent feasible.  
 
  Accordingly, our extended model implies a labor supply curve that differs starkly 
from the one derived under the assumptions of the standard model. In the standard, the labor 
supply curve starts with an upward sloping section, that is, the labor supply initially increases 







> ), implying that at low wage 
rates leisure is a normal good in that it has a downward sloping demand curve. Then, beyond 
a sufficiently high wage rate, it can become backward bending 







 > > ), implying that leisure becomes a Giffen 
good! In contrast, in our model the labor supply curve begins with a vertical section at 
  14* lT = (perfectly inelastic labor supply) at wage rates below  (or equivalently at incomes 
below  ), although, for  the labor supply curve could take various shapes including 
backward bending, depending on individual’s preferences for consumption, leisure, and 
nonpecuniary value of work.  
B w
B wT B ww >
That for wage rates less than  the labor supply curve is vertical at   is easy to 
explain. We recall that at the wage rate  , corresponding to the boundary solution at point 









ˆ . So, as the wage rate falls below  , and 
hence income falls below  , the net marginal utility of labor, 
B w
B cw T = ( , ) lz m uc l - U+ Um ( l ) ′ = , 
increases, and exceeds  ( , ) 0 lB uw T T< , thus inducing an increase in labor supply. But, since 
the total time availability constraint is binding, we have 
* lT =  for all wage rates less than 
.  It is important, however, to note that the vertical labor supply curve at   consists of 
two different segments each presenting a different regime. One regime pertains to wage rates 
, or, equivalently, to income levels  , for which, the marginal value 
of leisure ( >0) is still large enough to dominate that of NPE (
B w
* lT =
ˆ B ww >> w ˆ B wT c w T >>
z U ( ) 0 m Uml ′ > ) and hence yield 
. The other regime pertains to wage rates below  or, equivalently, to 
income levels below  . In this regime, the marginal value of leisure ( >0) for a very 
poor individual becomes so small that it is dominated by the marginal value of NPE, thus 
rendering the net marginal effect of work on utility positive (
lz m u- U + U m ( l ) < 0 ′ = ˆ w
ˆ wT z U
lz m u- U + U m ( l ) > 0 ′ = ). 
Figures 2.a and 2.b below depict two examples of the labor supply curve implied by 
our model. Figure 2.a represents the labor supply curve of an individual who, due to 
nonpecuniary value of work, supplies as many hours of work as possible when the wage rate 
is at or below . However, if she has a target income or a certain consumption standard 
represented by , she reduces her work hours as the wage rate rises above  , although 
she always works a minimum of
B w
B wT B w
l  hours no matter how high the wage rate may become.  
This may reflect the labor supply behavior of poor or low-income individuals or 
  15households
13.  In the Appendix we show that for the specific example of the utility function 
noted in footnote 7, i.e.,  , the labor supply curve would indeed look 
like that pictured in Figure 2.a. 
ηη cl u(c,l)= c l + c(1-l) γ
 Figure 2.b, on the other hand, presents the labor supply curve of an individual who, 
as in the previous case, works as much as possible when the wage rate is less than or equal to 
, and reduces his labor supply for the medium wage rates between   and  B w B w w. But, 
perhaps because he has no target income level or is strongly driven by nonpecuniary value of 
his work, the backward bending supply curve reverses its direction at sufficiently high wage 
rates, so that the individual increases his work hours as his wage rate increases beyond a 
certain (presumably very high) level, w. The individual, however, chooses to enjoy some 
minimum leisure time ( ) no matter how high his wage rate may become. Some 
empirical evidence for this type of labor supply behavior is noted by Morgan (1968, p.33) 
who found that “ [T]he very highest income people are so driven to work, but by forces other 
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    Figure 2.a                                                Figure 2.b 
 
                                                 
13 For some empirical evidence of the negatively-sloped labor supply curve see, for example, Camerer 
et al. (1997)(2002) and Morgan (1968). 
  16                 Two further questions of interest are: First, how is the individual’s labor supply 
affected by the extent of the NPE an individual derives from employment? Specifically, does 
a greater NPE imply a greater individual labor supply? Second, as a special interesting case 
of this question, would labor supply always be greater if the individual derives positive NPE 
from work than if, as assumed in the standard theory, she does not?  To answer these 
questions, let, as before,   capture all the NPE as a function of time worked, where it is 
assumed that   and 
( ) ml
( ) 0 ml ′ > ( ) 0 ml ′′ ≤ .  The extent to which the individual considers these 
effects is indicated by the parameter [0,1] α ∈ . Thus,  0 α =  if, as assumed in the standard 
theory, the individual does not consider the NPE of her working time, and  1 α =  if she fully 
takes these effects into account.  More generally, let  ( ) nm l α = be the extent to which the 
individual accounts for the NPE, and  be her utility function, which she maximizes 
subject to the time and budget constraints given in (5).  Denoting the value function by 
, the first and second order conditions for a locally unique 
interior optimum are  
( , , ) Uczn
* (,) m a x ( , , ( ) ) vl Uw lT l ml α ≡− α
* =
<
       (9) 
* (,) / () 0 czn vl l w U U U m l αα ′ ∂∂ = − +
          ( 9 ’ )  
2* 2 (,) / 0 , vl l α ∂∂
where for notational convenience the arguments of the utility function are omitted. 
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Recalling from the second order condition (9’) that 
2* 2 (,) / 0 vl l α ∂ ∂<, the sign of 
* / l α ∂∂  is 
the same as that of  
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 is generally ambiguous. However, 
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εα ≡−  the elasticity of the marginal utility of NPE, then from (9’) 








∂ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ =⇔ = ⎨⎬ ⎨⎬
∂ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ <> ⎩⎭ ⎩⎭
1        ( 1 2 )  
Thus, by (12), the answer to the first question posed above can be stated as 
Proposition 3: If individual preferences are additively separable in nonpecuniary effects of 
employment, then the greater the nonpecuniary effects (i.e., the largerα ) the greater will be 




  The additively separable preferences in Proposition 3 can generally take the form 
o f , where is the standard utility function where utility 
depends only on consumption and leisure, and  denotes the utility from NPE of 
employment. This has a number of interesting implications. For example, when
(,,) (,) ()





N Un B = , 
that is, the utility of nonpecuniary effects the individual derives from work is simply a flat 
amount and hence invariant with hours of work, then  0 n U ≡  in (11’) so that, by (10’), the 
nonpecuniary incentive would not affect labor supply, although it would still play a key role 
in individual’s employment choice.   It is also clear that if the utility of NPE increases 
linearly with hours worked, i.e. ( )
N Un n β = , 0 β > , then  0 n ε =  for all  , so that, by 
(12), the individual will supply more labor than she would in the absence of  nonpecuniary 
work incentive. 
0 n >
                                                 
14 While we have focused on the positive non-pecuniary effects of employment, it should be clear that 
the reverse of the result furnished in Proposition 3 holds when the individual associates negative non-
pecuniary effects with work, thus exacerbating the disutility of work.  
  18  Furthermore, to answer the second question posed above, we note that for the special 
case when the individual does not take any of the NPE of her employment into 

















. Thus,  
Corollary 1:  When preferences are additively separable in nonpecuniary effects of 
employment, the individual’s labor supply will be greater when she takes the nonpecuniary 
effects into account (0 ) α > than when, as assumed in the standard theory, she does not 
( 0 α = ).  
 
4.  Non-wage Income and Nonpecuniary Effect of Employment 
  So far we have assumed that the individual’s income derives entirely from working 
hours supplied. One would like, however, to know how would (a) non-wage income (for 
example, income derived from wealth or transfers), and (b) voluntary work affect labor 
supply in the presence of nonpecuniary work incentives.  In particular, does, as intuition 
suggests, non-wage income counteract the nonpecuniary effects of work to result in reduced 
individual labor supply? How does non-wage income affect labor supply when labor is 
supplied voluntarily?  
(a) The Effect of Non-wage Income 
Denoting the non-wage income by  0 π > , it alters the individual’s budget constraint 
in the optimization problem (5) to 
     0, 0 cc π +− ≥ ≥   wl        (13) 
  but leaves the optimality conditions (6) unchanged. Figure 3 depicts the optimal choices 
corresponding to different cases. 
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Figure 3:  labor supply with nonpecuniary incentives and non-wage income 





. Obviously only Case (1) that 
characterizes an interior solution is the relevant case for this purpose.  Recalling from (7) that 
for this case  0 ν =  and using the first two optimality conditions in (6) and the new budget 
constraint (10), we have at the optimum, , that   
** (,) cl
           (14)                                    
** ** (, ) (, ) lc uw l l w uw l l ππ +++   0 =  
Clearly, in order for an interior optimum to exist, for any given non-wage income,  0 π ≥ , the 
wage rate must exceed a critical minimum level ( ) B w π , corresponding to the wage rate for the 
boundary optimum at B. That is, we must have ( ) B ww π > , where  ( ) B w π  is the solution to  
     (, )(, ) lB B cB uw T T w uw T T 0 π π +++=        (14’) 
    Differentiating (14) totally with respect to  and
* l π , and omitting the arguments 
of the functions, we have  
** (,) cl
    
2 * 2 lc cc ll
cl cc
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  20Recalling that at the optimum  0 , 0 ll l uu < <  and that by assumption   and  0 cc u < 0 cl u ≤ , it 








.  Thus,  
Proposition 4: For any  0 π ≥ , as long as () B ww π > , an increase in the individual’s non-wage 
income induces a reduction in her labor supply.  
 
    This result is in accord with the standard model and therefore should come as no 
surprise. Given that labor is a source of disutility for the case under question, a higher non-
wage income motivates the individual to substitute leisure for consumption. On the other hand,  
for any non-wage income π , a wage rate less than the corresponding minimum wage, 
() B ww π < , induces the individual to supply labor as much as possible (corner solutions, 
, in Case (2) and Case (3)). So, a question of interest is whether an increase in the non-
wage income would enlarge or reduce the range of wage rates for which labor would be fully 
and perfectly inelastically supplied. The answer to this question depends on the sign of 
* lT =




, which can be determined by differentiating  (14’) totally with respect to  and  B w π , 
and simplifying to yield 
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ε ≡−  are the magnitudes of the elasticities of the marginal utility 
of consumption with respect to labor and consumption, respectively, evaluated at the optimum 
(, ) B wTT π + . Since the numerator in (16) is positive, it follows that  
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, implying that an increase in the individual’s non-wage 
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. 
  21    This is a rather striking result, for economic intuition would suggest that a higher 
non-wage income raises the marginal value of leisure and thus should necessitate a higher 
wage rate in order to motivate the individual to supply as many work hours as possible. That is, 








 to be always the case. Noting that, by substituting 
from (4’), one has (
cl cz cm z
l
cc z m
lu cU cU U l
uc u U U
ε =− = − ) , we can identify the conditions under which 
this would indeed be the case.  Namely, if individual preferences are such that: (i) additional 
consumption is not much valued (implying a small value of  c ε ), or (ii) leisure is not much 
valued (small ), or (iii) consumption value is almost equally raised by an increase in the 
amount of leisure or in nonpecuniary effect of work (the latter two conditions implying a small 
value for
z U
l ε ), or (iv) if the individual derives a large portion of his income from non-wage 
sources, or (v) a combination of these conditions so that  (1 ) 1 l c
c
π
εε + −< .  These seem to fit 
well the case of a rich, “workaholic” person. Surprisingly, however, as Proposition 4 indicates, 
the opposite case may also hold if an increase in the non-wage income, and hence 
consumption, lowers the marginal utility of consumption significantly and makes work so 
unpleasant (or equivalently, raises the value of leisure so strongly) that only a reduction in the 
wage rate can counteract these effects to motivate the individual to work as much as she did 
before the non-wage income increase. This rather counter-intuitive case is more likely to hold 
for a very poor individual who depends predominantly on wage income for her livelihood and 
attaches little nonpecuniary value to work.   
    Some special cases of preferences that support each of the two opposite effects in 
Proposition 4 are noteworthy. One is the case where individual preferences are additively 
separable in consumption, implying  0 cl l u ε = = , so that  
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ε ≡−  measures the degree of relative risk aversion, we can state the 
following  
  22Corollary 2:  When individual preferences are additively separable in  consumption, an 
increase in the non-wage income is more likely to enlarge (shrink) the range of wage rates for 
which  labor is supplied fully, the less (more) risk averse and/or the less (more) dependent the 
individual  is on wage income for livelihood.  
 











, with 1 c ε ≤ , a higher non-wage 
income enlarges the wage range for which labor is fully supplied.  
 
(b) Voluntary Work 
    Voluntary work can take a wide variety of forms, including work for charity and 
religious institutions, work to promote a public cause such as education, political awareness, 
promotion of social and economic equality, reduction of poverty, prevention of diseases, 
promotion of peace, or solidarity with one’s group or community, among many others.  The 
common feature of all such works is that the individual supplies labor without receiving 
monetary rewards. Instead, it is the nonpecuniary benefits that motivate people to engage in 
voluntary work.  Accordingly, the decision about how much voluntary work to supply presents 
a special case of our model when  0 w =  so that the budget constraint simplifies to c π = . For 
this special case, the necessary optimality condition reduces to  .  
But, as we already know from (3), the implicit solution to this equation is none but  , 
which for any   (or equivalently any non-wage income 
( , , ( )) ( , ) 0 ll Uc T l m l uc l −≡=
ˆ() ll c =
c π ) gives the supply of labor that 
maximizes utility by equating the marginal utility of leisure with that of nonpecuniary effect of 
labor, i.e.  ( , )/ ( ) 0 zm ucl l U U ml ′ ∂∂ = − + = . Thus, the curve labeled  in Figure 3 represents 
the optimal decision about the amount of voluntary work.  As is noted from point D in Figure 
3, there is a critical non-wage income level 
ˆ() lc
ˆ π  (= consumption level  ), determined by 
, which separates interior solutions from corner solutions.  Furthermore, since 
is a decreasing function of 
ˆ c
1 ˆ ˆˆ () clT π
− ==






 for  ˆ π π > .   Thus, we have  
Proposition 6:  When an individual chooses voluntary work, there is a critical non-wage 
income level  such that for any income at or below this level the individual will 
always supply work as much as possible, while for income levels above it she will choose to 
enjoy a level of leisure that increases with her income.  
1 ˆ ˆˆ () clT π
− ==
 
  23  This proposition suggests a theoretical prediction that seems consistent with casual 
observations; namely, other things being equal, one should expect rich people to supply less 
voluntary work than poor people do. The economic intuition for this hypothesis is clear: rich 
people value leisure and can afford to spend time on leisure, more than poor people do. They 
also tend to derive nonpecuniary benefits more from other sources (for example, donating 
money to charitable institutions, political parties, and alike) than from doing voluntary work. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have shown that once the standard theory of individual labor supply is extended 
to allow for socio-psychological (nonpecuniary) work incentives, several new and important 
insights emerge about individual labor supply decisions.  
First, we have seen that the opportunity cost of nonwork/leisure time consists of a 
pecuniary component (the wage rate) and a nonpecuniary element, and an individual trades 
off one for the other in making labor supply decision and employment choices. This result 
has important implications for valuation of individual’s nonwork time and can help to 
explain many phenomena that in the context of standard theory may seem puzzling. For 
example, it tells us that,, contrary to what is customary in cost-benefit analyses of nonwork 
activities, valuing nonwork time at individual’s wage rate understates (overstates) its true 
value when time spent on work renders nonpecuniary benefits (costs).. It can also help 
explaining (i) why it can be difficult to induce early retirement even when attractive 
unemployment (or retirement) benefits are available, (ii) why the civilian labor supply was at 
a record high (Mulligan (1998) during World War II despite a significant decrease in after-
tax real wages (iii) why permit prices exceed the present value of the expected stream of 
rents from fishing in limited-entry fisheries, and why poor fishermen continue fishing rather 
than selling their permits (Karpoff (1985)), and why, in contrast to wage efficiency theory, 
offering high wage rates in vocation-intensive professions may reduce the quality of 
candidates. At the same, this result suggests a broad guide for firms to improve the efficiency 
of their employment strategies by taking actions that enhance their workers’ nonpecuniary 
incentives. Such actions could include, for example, offering (a) workers paid child care on 
site, (b) flexible working hours including telecommuting, (c) job training courses that can 
have positive nonpecuniary effects by helping to foster a sense of learning new things even if 
  24they have no effect on the workers’ actual productivity, (d) opportunities to participate and 
make suggestions on how to improve manufacturing processes, (e) a say in selecting 
supervisors as a  means of worker empowerment, (f) various group social events that 
contribute to a feeling of worker cohesion and belonging, and (g) various award programs for 
recognizing outstanding performance in public.    
  Second, we have shown that at very low wage rates, work can become a net source 
of utility, thus inducing very poor individuals to work at a maximum feasible level. An 
important implication of this finding is that the labor supply curve implied by the extended 
model differs sharply from the standard textbook curve. Here the supply curve begins with a 
vertical segment, showing that labor is supplied as much as feasible for an initial range of 
low wage rates, and then follows a downward sloping segment for higher wage rates.  
Third, we have identified the conditions under which a greater nonpecuniary effect of 
employment unambiguously leads to a greater individual labor supply; namely, when 
preferences are additively separable in nonpecuniary effect and the elasticity of the marginal 
utility of nonpecuniary effect is less than one.  
The introduction of non-wage income in our model has yielded further insights. We 
have shown that for any given non-wage income, as wage rates increase beyond a certain 
critical level, labor supply shrinks, as should be normally expected. However, this critical 
wage rate may increase or decrease as the non-wage income increases, depending on the 
magnitudes of the elasticities of marginal utility of consumption and the share of non-wage 
income in total income. In particular, when magnitudes of these factors are sufficiently 
small-as is more likely to be the case for a rich individual- then a higher non-wage income 
induces the individual to supply as much labor as feasible for a wider range of wage rates. 
The opposite is more likely to hold for a very poor worker whose preferences exhibit large 
values of the elasticities of marginal utility of consumption.  Another insight is that when 
income consists entirely of non-wage income, as in the case of people doing voluntary work 
only, our model predicts that the supply of voluntary work will be greater the lower is the 
individual’s income.  
The simple model developed in this paper can be extended in several interesting 
directions. For example, we could investigate how the individual’s labor supply decision 
would be affected by allowing for other sources of nonpecuniary incentives, such as 
  25charitable donations. Another extension would consider the household’s rather than the 
individual’s labor supply while allowing for the heterogeneous nonpecuniary work incentives 
of household members.  Of particular interest would be to conduct empirical studies to 
measure the significance of nonpecuniary work incentives in labor supply decisions, and to 
test how it may be affected by idiosyncratic factors such as individual’s age, gender, 
education level, marital status, household size, cultural and ethnic background, the 
employment status (self-employed versus wage earners, unpaid voluntary work and 
housework), the geographical location of work (urban versus rural), and so on. The insights 
from such studies could aid policymakers to address unemployment issues more effectively 
by considering not only the policies that merely affect individuals’ monetary work incentive 
but also those that enhance their nonpecuniary incentives. Finally, the nonpecuniary value of 
employment has an important implication for welfare policy: if unemployment is the cause of 
poverty and its associated welfare loss, then a policy of income transfer to people will only 
compensate for the pecuniary effect. To improve welfare, policy should aim at providing 
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Derivation of an example of the labor supply curve shown in Figure 2.a. 
 





The first order condition for an interior optimum is  
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d
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The second order condition is  
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ε ≡−  denote the magnitudes of the elasticities 
of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to consumption and labor, we have 
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       ( A 3 )  
 
Now consider the utility function  
 
      (A4) 
η ηcl u(c,l)= c l +γc(1-l),   l [0,1],    0 < η < η <1,  γ >0 c l
∈
where the time endowment is normalized so that  1 T =  
 
The first order condition for an optimum is 
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Cl Cl Cl ηη ηη ηη Cl
Cl
wηη
cl+ w γ(1-l)+ c l -γc= η +η cl+ c γ(1-2l) /l=0
cl
⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (A5) 
 
Notice that to satisfy this equation, it must be that  .    l>0 . 5
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 (A6) 
where the third equality and the last inequality are derived by using (A5). 
 
The inequality (A6) implies that the associated labor supply decreases with the wage rate. 
    
Further, since   and  C η <1
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−  ),  
so that the labor supply curve starts from l= .  This together with (A5) and (A6) imply 
a labor supply curve as depicted in Figure 2.a.  
T( =1)
 
Finally, notice from (A3) that for a labor supply curve like that depicted in Figure 2.b, the 
individual’s preferences are such that at a sufficiently high wage rate the sum of the two 
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